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Abstract - Thirteen miners died as a result of 2 explosions in the 
Jim Walter Resources No. 5 mine near Brookwood AL in 
September 2001. Both explosions were ignited in intake air 
entries, and both were probably ignited by electrical equipment. 
With few exceptions, permissible equipment is not required in 
intake air entries of US underground coal mines Researchers 
with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
Pittsbureh Research Laboraton. studied the electrical
- .
equipmeitignition sources for the ~ ~ ~ and k~ other w 
disasters to develop recommendations for preventing similar 
disasters Adherence to National Electrical codea requirements 
for flexible cords installed in hazardous (classified) locations 
may have prevented the second massive Brookwood explosion. 
The 30 CFR Part 7 requirements for battery assemblies should 
be reevaluated, taking into consideration United Mine Workers 
of America recommendations and the Zone 1"increased safety" 
standard requirements for battery assemblies, Class 1 Division 
2 or Zone 2 emlosion oroteclion techniaues are recommended 
for intake air equipmedt so that they do not present a methans 
air ienition source under normal oneration. before mine Dower 
is s& do- circuits in during emergencies ' ~ a t t e r ~ ' ~ o w e r e d  
intake air that are likely to remain enerdzed during 
emergencies should be protected by more stringent protection 
techniques, to protect rescudrecovery personnel. 
Index Terms - Class I hazardous location, mine explosion, 
flexible cord, battery assembly, permissible equipment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gas or dust explosions are some of the greatest hazards 
faced by underground coal mine workers. Explosions may be 
infrequent, but can account for large numbers of deaths when 
they do occur. Methane gas is released during the mining 
process and accumulates in areas that are not well ventilated. 
Coal dust accumulations can form explosive dust clouds 
when entrained into the air. Methane ignitions or explosives 
can dsperse coal dust layers into the atmosphere that 
subsequently ignite and propagate as powerful explosions. 
Over the last 30 years, a number of fatal underground coal 
mine explosions have been linked to nonpermissible 
electrical equipment ignition sources when flammable gas 
migrated outby the last open crosscut under abnormal 
conditions due to inadequate ventilation (Table 1) [I]. The 
most recent of these fatal intake air explosions occurred at the 
Jim Walter Resources (JWR) Inc. No. 5 mine near 
Brookwood AL in September of 2001, where 13 miners died 
as a result of 2 explosions involving methane and coal dust, 
both of which were ignited in intake air entries, and both of 
which were probably ignited by electrical equipment. 
Researchers with the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory (NIOSH, 
p p ~ )studied the electrical eauiument ignition sources 
-
for the 
Bro~kwood disaster to . . develop equipment design 
recommendations for preventing similar disasters in the 
future (The and in this report are those 
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
~ ~ d TheNational Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.) 
equipment studied was described in the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration [2] and United M n e  Workers of 
America 131 
. 
on the disaster. 
L A 
The term uermissible refers to eauiument that 
. . 
meets 
specifications for the construction and maintenance of such 
equipment, to assure that such equipment will not cause a 
Or mine fire (30 CFR 752) I 4 1  
that is methane Or dust 
inby the last open crosscut (30 CFR 75.500), or within 150 
feet of uillar workings or longwall faces 130 CFR 75.1002'1. 
,. 
or in r& entries 730 cF~-75.507), mist be permissible. 
Air quality detectors and measurement devices shall be 
auuroved and maintained in uermissible and urouer ouerating 
. .  . -
condition (30 CFR 75.326). Telephones and signaling 
devices shall offer no probable explosion hazard under 
normal oueration if used in gassv or dustv mine atmosuheres 
-
(30 CFR 23.6). Electrical components of automatic fire 
sensors must be urovided with urotection against ignition of 
methane or coal'dust (30 CFR' 751103.7)~ The explosion 
protection techniques most familiar to the underground coal 
mining industry are explosion proof enclosures and two-fault 
intrinsic safety. With few exceptions, explosion protected 
electrical equipment is generally not required in intake air 
entries of underground mines. 
I1  THE 2001 BROOKWOOD DISASTER 
On September 23, 2001, two explosions occurred about 1 
hour apart in 4 Section of the JWR No. 5 Mne, resulting in 
13 deaths [2,3]. Prior to the first explosion, four workers 
were building supplemental roof support cribs in an area 
where the mine roof and ribs were deteriorating. A scoop 
battery charging station was under the bad roof, and next to a 
stopping separating methane-laden return air kom kesh 
ventilation air. This mine liberated 17.2 million cubic feet of 
methane per day through the returns and out the mine 
exhausts. Methane bleeders in the roof and floor were 
prevalent. The battery charger was placed next to the 
U.S. Government worknot protected by U.S. copyright 
Table 1.  Fatal methane and methane plus coal dust explosions in US underground coal mines since 1976 linked to 
nonpermissible electrical equipment in intake air entries. 
Year Operator, mine, and state Fuel Ignition Possible ignition sources Killed 
location 
1976 Scotia Coal Co., Scotia Methane Intake Normal arcing of battery powered 15 
(1 of 2) Mine, KY locomotive 
1980 Westmoreland Coal Co., Methane Intake Trolley wire powered locomotive 5 
Ferrell #17 Mine, WV 
1983 Clinchfield Coal Co., Methane Intake Battery powered track mounted 7 
McClure #1 Mine, VA mantrip, power center circuit breaker, 
dinner hole light connection, cable 
plug for CM trailing cable, belt 
control cable disconnect or fault, 
ground fault in trailing cable for 
conveyor belt feeder. 
1983 Helen Mining Co., Homer Methane Intake Arcing controller on vehicle 1 
City Mine, PA 
1984 Pennsylvania Mines Corp., Methane Intake Normal arcing of nonpermissible 3 
Greenwich Collieries #1 battery powered locomotive 
Mine, PA 
1987 Double R Coal Co., #1 Methane & Intake Two power centers, battery charging 1 
Mine, VA coal dust cable, faulted permissible scoop. 
2001 Jim Walter Resources Inc., Methane Intake Battery assembly removed from 1 
#5 Mine, Brookwood AL scoop and damaged by roof fall 
2001 Jim Walter Resources Inc., Methane & Intake Damaged block light cable 12 
#5 Mine, Brookwood AL coal dust 
45 
total 
stopping to facilitate battery venting to the return entry.  The 
roof caved in before the supplemental roof supports could be 
completed.  The cave-in damaged the stopping, allowing 
methane to migrate from the overburden and possibly the 
return entry onto the battery charging station.  The cave-in 
also damaged a battery enclosure, shorting the battery and 
igniting the first explosion.  Section ventilation controls were 
damaged by the blast. The four miners were injured in the 
relatively minor explosion, three of whom were able to 
escape from 4 Section on a diesel locomotive.  The 
incapacitated miner was injured during the first explosion. 
The MSHA report suggests the injuries may have been fatal. 
The 4 Section circuit breaker was tripped to remove power to 
the section; however a block light traffic control circuit 
remained energized because it was powered through a 
breaker located in another mine section. 
Within an hour, 12 miners went towards 4 Section to 
rescue the one remaining incapacitated miner.  In the mean 
time, methane gas had accumulated in 4 Section through the 
damaged ventilation controls.  Some of the rescuers drove the 
locomotive back into 4 Section. The locomotive ran over and 
entangled slack electrical cable for the live block light traffic 
control system. The cable was damaged in several places, 
exposing energized conductors.  Evidence suggests the 
coworkers reached the injured miner and were bringing him 
to safety.  It is thought that the rescuers may have disturbed 
the damaged, energized block light cable.  Or perhaps one of 
the miners had shown a caplamp onto a photo-switch in the 
master or slave block light units that energized a damaged 
conductor.  The spark ignited the second massive explosion, 
killing all the miners. 
III.  SELECTED MSHA FINDINGS 
MSHA concluded a live high voltage cable hit by the 
initial roof fall was not a likely ignition source for the first 
explosion.  Resistance measurements indicated the cabling 
was robust enough to prevent the conductors from being 
faulted. Even if the cable were faulted, the shielded 
conductors would have caused a ground fault, activating the 
protective circuit breaker in less than a second.  The ignition 
did not occur for a few minutes. The robust cabling design 
and the grounded shielding prevented the live high voltage 
cable from being an ignition source. 
MSHA determined a scoop battery was the likely ignition 
source for the first explosion.  The roof fall damaged the 
battery assembly such that the steel frame of the battery tray 
contacted both the negative battery terminal and an intercell 
connector.  The short circuit produced temperatures capable 
of igniting methane-air mixtures.  A permissibility 
examination was completed for the battery assembly.  No 
significant conflicts in design or construction with the 
approval documents were noted. 
MSHA determined the block light system was the most 
likely ignition source for the 2nd massive explosion.  The 
system consisted of two nonmetallic NEMA 4X enclosures 
with three lights and a photocell mounted in each, which 
were connected by long lengths of cable.  The block lights 
were used to control traffic in a particular section of the mine. 
A miner would shine his caplamp onto the photocell to 
activate the traffic control lights in each box before 
proceeding.  Fig. 1 is the block light circuit diagram 
replicated from the MSHA report appendix CC [2].  The 
system used 120 V for control signals and to power the lights. 
The boxes were connected by type SDT, 16 AWG, 12 
conductor, unshielded cable.  Six conductors were used and 6 
were spare.  Some conductors were connected to the line 
voltage and neutral.  Fig. 1 shows no separate grounding 
conductor in the block light cable between the nonmetallic 
enclosures, or an equipment bonding jumper in the master 
enclosure for such a grounding conductor.  No connections 
were shown for the spare conductors, suggesting they were 
not grounded.  Usually slack cable connecting the master unit 
to the slave unit was rolled up and placed behind the slave 
unit to be unwound as the section, track, and ultimately the 
slave unit were advanced. 
The MSHA report included a section on root cause 
analysis.  This section notes that underground electrical 
configurations should be reviewed to assure that their design 
or complexity would not confuse foremen or electricians, and 
unusual configurations should be made known to all persons 
working in the area.  No enforcement action was taken with 
regard to the design of the electrical equipment.  30 CFR 
75.516-2 (b) indicates that communication cables must be 
protected against mechanical damage in a manner approved 
by the Secretary.  MSHA did not interpret the block light 
cable installation as a violation of this requirement.  The 
electrical equipment that provided the ignition sources for the 
explosions were not required to be permissible while in the 
intake-air course. 
IV. CLASS I HAZARDOUS LOCATIONS 
Certain techniques are used to design electrical equipment 
to protect against igniting explosions in locations where 
flammable materials may be encountered under normal or 
abnormal conditions.  These locations are classified as 
Hazardous locations described in the National Electrical 
Code® (NEC®)1 [5].  NEC Article 500 describes Division 
locations while Article 505 describes Zone locations.  The 
requirements for Divisions and Zones differ somewhat 
because the Division system was developed in the US while 
1 National Electrical Code® and NEC® are registered trademarks of the 
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy MA. 
the Zone system was developed in Europe.  Zones were 
recognized in the NEC® beginning in 1996. NFPA 497 [6] 
and NFPA 499 [7] provide guidelines for classifying 
Hazardous Locations. 
The Hazardous Class refers to the flammable material; 
Class I materials are flammable gases and vapors (NEC 500.5 
(B)).  Methane is a Class I Group D (Division system) or 
Class I Group IIA (Zone system) flammable material.  Class I 
Group I (Zone system) refers to firedamp, defined as a 
mixture of gases, composed mostly of methane, found 
underground, usually in mines.  NFPA 497 [6] provides 
guidelines for classifying flammable liquids, gases, or vapors. 
Class I Division 1 and Zone 1 locations are described in 
NEC 500.5(B)(1) and 505.5(B)(2). One description is a 
location in which equipment is operated or processes are 
carried on, of such a nature that equipment breakdown or 
faulty operations could result in the release of ignitable 
concentrations of flammable gas and also cause simultaneous 
failure of electrical equipment in a mode to cause the 
electrical equipment to become a source of ignition.  A 
Division 1 or Zone 1 classification would be appropriate 
where common cause failures could release a flammable 
material and damage electrical equipment to produce an 
ignition source.  Division 1 protection techniques include 
those familiar to the mining industry: explosion proof 
enclosures and two-fault intrinsic safety.  Class I Division 1 
overlaps with Zone 0, which is a location where flammable 
gases or vapors are present continuously or for a long periods 
of time (NEC 505(B)(1)). 
One description of  Class I Division 2 or Zone 2 is a 
location where ignitable concentrations of gases or vapors are 
normally prevented by positive mechanical ventilation, and 
which might become hazardous through failure or abnormal 
operation of the ventilating equipment (NEC 500.5(B)(2) and 
505.5(B)(3)).  A rule of thumb for Division 2 or Zone 2 
equipment is that it should not be an ignition source under 
normal operation.  Redundant safety features are generally 
not required.  The safety justification for the equipment is 
that the explosion protection features are not likely to fail 
simultaneously with the infrequent process failure that 
releases the flammable material.  The less redundant or robust 
features of Division 2 or Zone 2 equipment reflect the layer 
of protection already provided by the flammable material 
containment or ventilation system to prevent the flammable 
atmosphere from contacting the electrical equipment. 
One condition for Class I Zone 2 locations is that if a 
flammable atmosphere is released, it will exist only for a 
short period (NEC 505.5(B)(3)).  A Class I Zone 2 restricted 
breathing enclosure, for example, will eventually leak, 
allowing a flammable concentration of gas to accumulate 
inside the enclosure if the enclosure is immersed in a 
flammable atmosphere for a long period of time.  Magison 
[8] analyzes gas diffusion into sealed enclosures for 
explosion prevention purposes. The hermetically sealed 
contacts of a vacuum circuit breaker are another example of a 
sealed enclosure that is not an ignition source under normal 
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Fig. 1.  Block light electrical circuit diagram. 
operation.  For normal operation of electrical equipment in 
underground coal mines, an upper limit of the duration the 
equipment may be exposed to methane can be estimated 
based on the timing of required periodic methane checks. 
During emergencies however, battery powered equipment 
may be abandoned and exposed to methane for an extended 
period of time.  More stringent protection would therefore be 
necessary for battery powered equipment abandoned during a 
mine emergency.  Magison [8] explains Sealing and several 
other practices and principles for preventing explosions 
ignited by electrical equipment. 
These descriptions of Divisions and Zones reflect the 
situation found in intake air courses of gassy underground 
coal mines ventilated by fresh air where normally sparking 
electrical equipment is allowed to be used, and which may 
become flammable when the ventilation system fails.  Fatal 
explosions in intake air courses ignited by electrical 
equipment have occurred numerous times in the past (Table 
1) [1].  Underground mines rely primarily on maintaining 
adequate ventilation and periodic methane checks to prevent 
explosions in intake air courses (30 CFR Part 75 Subpart D). 
Requirements for Division 2 or Zone 2 approved equipment 
imply that when lives are at stake, a good ventilation system 
should not be used in place of the protected equipment; 
rather, the protected equipment is a necessary layer of 
protection along with the ventilation system. 
V.  BROOKWOOD IGNITION SOURCES ANALYSIS 
A. Block light installation 
Due to a series of events resulting from a roof fall and 
loss of ventilation, flammable gas migrated to damaged, slack 
cable near the block light slave unit, which most likely 
ignited the fatal second explosion.  The flammable gas 
migrated to the unprotected equipment under infrequent, 
abnormal conditions when the ventilation system failed.  This 
situation fits the NEC® description of a Class I Division 2 or 
Zone 2 hazardous location, which is a location where 
ignitable concentrations of gases or vapors are normally 
prevented by positive mechanical ventilation, and which 
might become hazardous through failure or abnormal 
operation of the ventilating equipment. 
The block light installation apparently did not meet 
several NEC® requirements for Class I hazardous locations. 
The installation of long lengths of slack, unsecured block 
light cable that became entangled and most likely provided 
the ignition source for the 2nd massive explosion may not 
have met 1999 NEC 501.11 which states that flexible cord 
used in a Class I Division 1 or 2 hazardous location is to be 
protected by location or a suitable guard from damage2. 
Spare conductors in the unshielded block light cable 
apparently were not grounded.  Fig. 1 shows no separate 
grounding conductor in the block light cable between the 
2 The 1999 edition of the NEC was the current edition at the time of the 
Brookwood disaster.  NEC clause 501.11 was moved to clause 501.140 in 
the 2005 edition. 
nonmetallic enclosures, or an equipment bonding jumper in 
the master enclosure for such a grounding conductor.  The 
1999 NEC 501.11 requires flexible cord to contain, in 
addition to the conductors of the circuit, a grounding 
conductor.  The block light type SDT cable is not listed in 
NEC Table 400-4 as a type considered acceptable for extra 
hard usage.  The 1999 NEC 501.11 requires flexible cord to 
be listed for extra hard usage.  Robust protection provided by 
extra hard usage cord jacketing material combined with a 
grounding conductor and grounded spares inside the cord 
may have allowed a short to ground to activate the circuit 
protection fuse before the outer jacketing material was 
compromised, exposing the conductors to the flammable 
atmosphere (The 1999 NEC 501-6 provides requirements for 
fuses in Class I Division 1 and 2.).  The live high voltage 
cable discussed above was determined not to be an ignition 
source for the first explosion for comparable reasons. 
Adherence to these NEC® requirements written specifically 
for preventing explosions may have prevented the massive 
second Brookwood explosion. 
B. Battery assembly 
The first explosion involving the battery assembly fits the 
description of Class I Division 1 or Zone 1, defined as a 
location in which equipment is operated or processes are 
carried on, of such a nature that equipment breakdown or 
faulty operations could result in the release of ignitable 
concentrations of flammable gas and also cause simultaneous 
failure of electrical equipment in a mode to cause the 
electrical equipment to become a source of ignition. The roof 
fall damaged the ventilation controls, released methane gas, 
and damaged the battery assembly so as to produce an 
ignition source.  Also, there was no way of deenergizing the 
battery during the initial emergency, allowing the ignition 
hazard to persist while methane gas accumulated around the 
battery.  The common cause failures produced by the roof fall 
and the persistence of the battery ignition hazard over time 
suggest the battery assembly should have been protected by 
Division 1 or Zone 1 techniques. 
MSHA found no significant problems with the battery 
assembly linked to the first explosion.  30 CFR Part 7 Subpart 
C lists federal requirements for battery enclosures.  The 
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) contend the 
battery enclosure was not well insulated, even though an 
insulation option was available from the manufacturer [3]. 
Following the disaster, the UMWA requested that such 
insulation be provided.  The UMWA also requested 
installation of rubber conduit on all cables and leads, and 
support braces for the enclosure to protect the battery from 
damage from foreseeable roof falls. Extra structural support 
should take into consideration that manufacturers recommend 
opening the battery cover during charging to prevent the 
build-up of explosive hydrogen-air concentrations, and to 
provide cooling for the cells.  The standard for the Zone 1 
protection technique “increased safety” calls for sufficient 
insulation between a battery enclosure and cells to prevent 
shorting [9].  The 30 CFR Part 7 requirements for battery 
assemblies should be reevaluated, taking into consideration 
the UMWA recommendations and “increased safety” 
requirements for battery assemblies. 
The UMWA also requested that gas detectors be placed 
near a power center and in a fresh air entry.  These 
recommendations are in line with the Division 2 protection 
technique “Combustible Gas Detection System” called out in 
NEC 501.7 (K).  The UMWA recognized the need to 
explosion protect equipment in fresh air locations susceptible 
to fugitive emissions of flammable gas, protections already 
enjoyed by workers in other industries. 
VI.  HAZARDOUS LOCATION SURVEY 
Babiarz et al [10] conducted a survey of electrical cable 
vs. conduit usage in hazardous (classified) locations.  About 
125 U.S. and Canadian electrical professionals responded to 
the survey.  The respondents were employed at oil refineries, 
chemical plants, pulp and paper mills, or were consultants to 
these industries.  Over 95% of the respondents represented 
heavy industry with electrical installations in hazardous 
(classified) locations.  The respondents with hazardous 
(classified) locations reported 90% of their hazardous areas 
were classified as Division 2, compared to only 5% classified 
as Division 1.  Division 1 protection techniques include those 
familiar to the mining industry: explosion proof enclosures 
and two-fault intrinsic safety.  This survey demonstrates that 
Division 2 classified locations are common in North 
American industries at risk from fugitive emissions of 
flammable gas, except for underground coal mines.   
VII.  BROOKWOOD VS. TEXAS CITY DISASTER 
Certain aspects of the Brookwood disaster can be 
compared to the BP refinery explosion in Texas City, TX on 
March 23, 2005, killing 15 workers [11].  The explosions for 
both disasters were ignited in locations where flammable 
gases or vapors occurred infrequently, but were foreseeable, 
and both fatal explosions were likely ignited by 
nonpermissible equipment.  The possible ignition sources for 
the BP disaster were in locations probably less likely to be 
exposed to flammable atmospheres than working sections of 
gassy underground coal mines.  OSHA cited BP North 
America for 167 egregious willful violations for using non-
intrinsically safe electrical equipment in these locations.  The 
proposed penalty for these electrical equipment violations 
alone was over $11 million.  Civil lawsuits will likely involve 
much higher amounts.  In contrast, MSHA did not issue any 
citations or make any recommendations in their root cause 
analysis with regard to the design of the electrical equipment 
that ignited both JWR explosions.  Subsequently, fines of 
$435,000 were reduced to $3,000 after an administrative law 
judge ruled the company’s safety violations were minor [12]. 
VIII. ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SURFACE

COAL MINES 

Federal mining regulations for surface coal mines and 
surface work areas of underground coal mines require all 
wiring and electrical equipment to meet requirements of the 
NEC® in effect at the time of installation [30 CFR 77.516]. 
Such wiring and equipment would be subject to NEC® 
requirements for Division 2 locations, where applicable. 
Similar provisions are not found in 30 CFR Part 75 for 
underground coal mines.   NEC® explosion protection 
requirements and techniques for Division 2 are recognized for 
surface locations of coal mines, but not for underground 
locations fitting the same criteria. 
IX.  EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN PROCEDURES 
Federal regulations require that electrical power be shut 
off in an emergency such as occurred at Brookwood (30 CFR 
75.323).  Mine workers did shut down the electrical power to 
the section where the second explosion occurred, however, 
the block light slave unit in the section remained energized 
for several reasons.  Although the power to the section was 
disconnected, the block light slave unit was powered by a 
cable from another section.  A later communications 
breakdown prevented the electrical power for the whole mine 
from being disconnected in time.  One lesson from the 
Brookwood disaster may be that an orderly, manual 
shutdown of electrical power systems during the chaos of a 
mine emergency may not be a practical method of preventing 
explosions ignited by nonpermissible electrical equipment. 
Also, an unprotected electrical disconnect located near the 
source of gas release and activated during an emergency 
could provide the spark to ignite an explosion.  Division 2 or 
Zone 2 protection techniques can provide a critical window 
of protection before all electrical power is shut down. 
X.  RISK ASSESSMENT FOR EXPLOSION 
PROTECTED EQUIPMENT 
Although not recognized in the NEC® yet, a risk 
assessment approach for the acceptance of explosion 
protected equipment has been introduced by the International 
Electrotechnical Commission, Technical Committee 31 (IEC 
TC 31), as an alternative method to the current prescriptive 
practice linking equipment to Zones [13].  To facilitate this, a 
system of equipment protection levels (EPLs) has been 
introduced to indicate the inherent ignition risk of the 
equipment, no matter what type of protection is used.  For 
coal mining, EPL Ma refers to equipment having a “very 
high” level of protection, which has sufficient security that it 
is unlikely to become an ignition source, even when left 
energized in the presence of an outbreak of gas.  Typically, 
communication circuits and gas detection equipment would 
be constructed to meet the Ma requirements. EPL Mb refers 
to equipment having a “high” level of protection, which has 
sufficient security that it is unlikely to become an ignition 
source in the time span between there being an outbreak of 
gas and the equipment being de-energized.  Typically all coal 
mining equipment would be constructed to meet the Mb 
requirements, for example flameproof motors and switchgear. 
The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation (ISA) 
Society SP12 committee for Hazardous Location Equipment 
includes US Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) for 
developing IEC TC 31 standards.  The SP 12 committee also 
works toward US adoption of IEC explosion protected 
equipment standards.  The ISA SP 12 committee recently 
established a mining working group to address explosion 
protected mining equipment.  US equipment users and 
manufacturers are encouraged to participate in the process. 
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Brookwood disaster and other fatal mine explosions 
suggest intake air entries of gassy underground coal mines 
that might become hazardous through failure or abnormal 
operation of the ventilating system should be considered as 
certain Hazardous (classified) locations per the NEC®.  Class 
I Division 2 or Zone 2 approved protection techniques should 
be used for non permissible intake-air electrical equipment 
that is likely to be de-energized during emergencies.  Non 
permissible intake-air equipment that is likely to remain 
energized for extended periods during emergencies, such as 
battery powered equipment, should be protected by Class 1 
Division 1 or Zone 1 techniques at a minimum, for the sake 
of the rescuers.  Flexible cords should be installed in 
accordance with 2005 NEC 501.140. The 30 CFR Part 7 
requirements for battery assemblies should be reevaluated, 
taking into consideration the UMWA recommendations and 
the Zone 1 “increased safety” standard requirements for 
battery assemblies.  US mining equipment users and 
manufacturers are encouraged to participate with the ISA SP 
12 committee to develop and adopt internationally 
harmonized guidelines for explosion protected equipment. 
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